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Results for “indirect prompt injection”

4 publications
Technical guideSource-based analysis

Run AI coding agents in GitHub Actions without exposing secrets

Treat the agent job as an untrusted-input processor. Follow the outside text from the trigger that admits it to the credentials it can reach, then split reading from writing so a successful injection reaches nothing worth stealing.

AI systems · GitHub / Anthropic / Google / Microsoft · By Cloud Security Desk
Technical guideSource-based analysis

Map the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications to cloud controls

Each OWASP agentic risk mapped to the controls AWS, Microsoft and Google document for their agent platforms, with a plain account of which risks no infrastructure setting can close.

AI systems · OWASP GenAI Security Project / Amazon Web Services / Microsoft Azure / Google Cloud · By Cloud Security Desk
Technical guideSource-based analysis

Design AI agents that contain indirect prompt injection

Filters lower the odds that an agent obeys injected text. Architecture decides what an obeying agent can reach. Compare six published patterns and CaMeL by what each removes, what it costs and what it still misses.

AI systems · Google DeepMind / AgentDojo / NIST / OWASP / Microsoft · By Cloud Security Desk
Technical guideSource-based analysis

Model output needs its own trust boundary

A model can produce valid JSON containing an unauthorized identifier, an unsafe link or text that a renderer interprets as code. The application consuming that output owns the next trust decision.

AI systems · OpenAI · By Cloud Security Desk